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Abstract
I analyse an economy where a search labour market and a matching mar-
riage market interact. The economy is populated by homogeneous workers,
rms and marriage partners (MPs). Workers simultaneously search for rms
in order to work and for MPs in order to marry. Firms post wages to at-
tract workers. MPs look for workers in order to marry. I assume that
married workers receive a pre-determined ow utility, and married MPs
derive ow utility equal to the workers earnings. This provides the link
between the markets. Noisy search in the labour market generates a dis-
tribution of wages. I show that the so called married wage premium can
be the consequence of frictions in both markets, without having to resort
to the typical explanations. In one equilibrium, MPs marry all workers,
regardless of their employment status. In a more interesting equilibrium,
MPs marry only high earners, while workers accept wages that render them
"unmarriageable". The workers reservation wage must compensate them
for the loss of marriageability in addition to the option of continued search
for better wages. This a¤ects the distributions of wages o¤ered and earned,
which are crucial in the MPs decision to marry/reject low earners.
Equilibria in a model with a search labour market and a
matching marriage market.
This paper analyses the equilibria in an economy where a search labour mar-
ket and a matching marriage market interact. The economy is populated
by ex-ante homogeneous workers, ex-ante homogenous rms, and ex-ante
homogeneous marriage partners (MPs). Workers simultaneously search for
rms in order to work and for marriage partners in order to marry. Firms
post wages to attract workers; whileMPs look for workers in order to marry.
I assume that married workers receive a pre-determined ow utility; and that
married MPs derive ow utility equal to the workers earnings (be it wage
or unemployment benet). This provides the link between the two markets.
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I use noisy search in the labour market to generate a distribution of wages
o¤ered and of wages earned1. In this set-up, a workers search for a rm
is analogous to a marriage partners search for a worker, and both will use
reservation wage strategies in their search e¤orts2. The decisions on reser-
vation wages are interdependent: workers decide on their own reservation
wage taking as given the marriage partnersreservation wage and the shape
of the wage o¤er distribution. Marriage partners decide on their own reser-
vation wage taking as given the workers reservation wage and the shape of
the distribution of wages earned.
To my knowledge, there is no other paper that analyses equilibrium in a
model with two interacting frictional markets where relationships in both
markets are long-term and interdependent decisions are taken by all sides
of the market. I believe this to be the main theoretical contribution of
this paper. Burdett, Lagos and Wright (2003,2004) present models in which
workers in a frictional labour market encounter opportunities to commit a
crime at a less that innite rate, which is eventually endogenised. The
workers decide on the reservation wage and on what they call the "crime"
wage: workers will not commit a crime if earning more than that. A big
di¤erence is that in Burdett, Lagos and Wright (2003), it is the workers who
make all the decisions, while in this paper all agents make interdependent
decisions3.
There is wide empirical evidence (and more than wide anecdotal evidence) to
1The modeling of noisy search is based on Burdett and Judd (1983). I assume that
when workers contact rms, they may have contacted one or two rms, with given proba-
bility strictly between 0 and 1. When rms are contacted by workers, they do not know if
the worker has contacted one or two rms. This gives rise to equilibrium wage dispersion
as rms balance the higher probability of a hire when o¤ering higher wages with the lower
prot given a hire is made.
2A marriage partner may not be willing to marry anybody earning less than a given
wage.
3 In Burdett, Lagos and Wright (2004), rms post wages, but it is still true that workers
deicde on both the reservation wage and the crime wage; while in here workers must take
as given the reservation wage used by MP s.
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support the idea that labour market performance of the prospective partner
is considered when making decisions about marriage. Ginther and Zavodny
(2001) nd evidence that men are selected into marriage on the basis of their
higher earning capabilities. They compare the wage premium among men
whose marriage was triggered by a pregnancy and was therefore followed by
a birth within seven months; with those whose marriage was not followed
by birth. Ginther and Zavodny (2001) nd that "married men with a pre-
marital conception generally have a lower return to marriage than other men
do"4. Gould and Paserman (2003) argue that 25% of marriage rate decline
since the 1980s can be explained by the increase in male wage inequality.
The argument is that wage inequality increases the option value for women
to search longer for a husband5. Loughran (2002) models womens search
for marriageable men in a similar manner as in this paper, but Loughran
(2002) is a decision theory model6, not an equilibrium model. Hence, he
completely ignores the role played by workers (searching for a job) and by
rms (posting wages), and of course the equilibrium consequences.
Lundberg (2005) makes a call for research into the interdependence of de-
cisions about work and marriage. The model presented here attempts to
be a theoretical contribution to one of the dimensions of such interdepen-
dence and its consequences. In particular, the paper shows that the so
called "married wage premium" (or, more general, a correlation between
mens wages and marital status) can in some circumstances be the equilib-
rium consequence of search frictions in the two markets. This is completely
unrelated to the traditional explanations for a link between wages and mar-
ital status based on specialization in the labour market and on unobserved
characteristics that are valuable both in the labour the marriage market 7.
4For evidence on this, see Zavodny (1998) and Marsiglio (1987).
5The empirical literature on the married wage premiume is extensive and mixed. It is
not my intention to provide a review of it here.
6Which is then used to motivate the non structural estimation of the relationship
between wage distribution of males and age at rst marriage of females.
7See Becker (1991) and Nakosteen and Zimmer (1987) respectively.
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Regarding the former, specialisation in the labour market after marriage is
not introduced at all in the paper. Regarding the latter, this would require
some kind of heterogeneity, so that some agents have the said unobserved
characteristics, while some do not.
I know of no other paper that analyses the equilibrium interaction of two
frictional markets, both giving rise to long term relationships. The labour
market and the housing market provide another example of inter-related
frictional markets with long term relationships. There is no reason why
the methodology used here could not be adapted to study the interaction of
those two markets. This is a line for further related research.
The details of this paper are set out in Section 1 below. I show that three
pure strategy equilibria exist in the environment generally described so far,
complemented by one mixed strategy equilibrium. In the simplest equi-
librium, which I term the Smitten Equilibrium, MPs accept all workers for
marriage, regardless of their employment status or current wage if employed.
In this case, the distributions of wages o¤ered and earned are so compressed
that it does not make sense for MPs to reject marriage to any worker in
order to engage in further search. In what I term the Picky Equilibrium,
MPs reject marriage to unemployed workers, but accept marriage to all em-
ployed workers, regardless of the wage earned. Perhaps the most interesting
equilibrium is the Very Picky Equilibrium, in which MPs reject marriage to
unemployed workers and to low earners, and only marry employed, high
earning workers. Notice, for this to be an equilibrium, conditions must be
such that workers are willing to accept wages that render them unmarriage-
able. I show when the conditions hold for this to be true. In this case, the
utility workers derive from marriage is particularly relevant. It a¤ects work-
ersreservation wage, since the reservation wage must compensate workers
for the loss of marriageability in addition to the option of continued search
for better wages. This a¤ects the distributions of wages o¤ered and of wages
earned, which in turn are crucial in the MPs decision to accept low earners
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for marriage or not.
I use some simplifying assumptions, the removal of which is the basis for
further or ongoing research. In particular, I assume that divorce is innitely
costly and therefore never occurs. When agents accept marriage, they do
so knowing that they will never get divorced. This allows me to solve the
problem analytically and to obtain interesting results about the marriage
problem. In the conclusion, I discuss the consequences of allowing for
divorce and preliminary results of ongoing research. A further assumption
is that single MPs enjoy a predetermined ow utility, which I call X: In
this set-up, X can have many interpretations, like the value of living with
parents, the value of accessing a low skill competitive labour market, or the
possibility of marrying di¤erently skilled workers. I discuss in the conclusion
consequences of modeling X in more detail and preliminary results.
Section 1 below sets up the model and the strategies for the rms, the
workers and the marriage partners. Sections 2 to 4 present the pure strategy
equilibria briey described above taking arrival rates as parametric. Section
5 endogenises the arrival rates and separates the parameter space into the
three pure strategy equilibria described above. Section 6 presents a mixed
strategy equilibrium and Section 7 concludes.
1 The Model.
Individual Firms and wage distributions.
Firms post wages and contact workers who are either single or married.
Firms can wage discriminate according to the workersmarital status. Con-
sider the problem vis-a-vis single workers rst. Each individual rm takes
as given the reservation wage of unemployed-single workers (R) and the dis-
tribution of wages for single workers o¤ered in the market G(w): When an
individual rm contacts a worker, the worker may have contacted only her
(with probability 0.5) or one other rm (with probability 0.5). If a rm of-
fers wage w, and worker accepts, ow productivity is p. The match destroys
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if the worker dies, at an exogenous rate : Hence, given a worker accepts
the job o¤er, the rms discounted prots from employing that worker are
(w) = p wr+ : Given that a worker has been contacted, and wage w is o¤ered,
the expected prots are
(w) = 0:5G(w)(w) + 0:5(w):
Equal prots condition: The lowest and highest wages in the market are
given by w
¯
and w respectively. Then for any wage w such that w
¯
 w  w;
it must be true that (w
¯
) = (w); where (w
¯
) = 0:5(w
¯
):
0:5(w
¯
) = 0:5G(w)(w) + 0:5(w)
G(w) =
 w
¯
+ w
p  w ; w =
p+ w
¯
2
In the sections below I will eventually impose the condition that R =w
¯
8.
Notice, G(w) is continuous along its support.
9The problem vis-a-vis married workers is analogue to the above, with the
di¤erence that the minimum and maximum wages need not be the same
as for single workers. Call w
¯ m
and wm the minimum and maximum wage
respectively in the wage distribution o¤ered to married workers. Then it is
given (analogously) by I(w) where:
I(w) =
 w
¯ m
+ w
p  w ; wm =
p+ w
¯ m
2
Firms take as given that the reservation wage of unemployed-married work-
ers is Rm: In the sections below, I will eventually impose the condition
that w
¯ m
= Rm
10: Notice, G(w) is continuous along its support. I model the
8Becasue of the standard argument: i) A wage w < R will not be o¤ered by any rm
because no worker will accept it. ii) Assume w
¯
> R, then F (w
¯
) = F (R) = 0. Then any
rm o¤ering w
¯
can reduce its wage o¤er all the way to R and increase its expected prots.
9Notice G( w) = 1:
10For reasons analogue to those exposed in footnote 8.
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labour market as a pure search market, hence rms can absorb all workers
that contact her and accept her wage o¤er.
Workers.
Workers take as given the reservation wage of MP s (T )11, and the distribu-
tion of wages o¤ered (G(w) for singles and I(w) for marrieds): Unemployed
workers decide their reservation wage (singles decide on R and marrieds de-
cide on Rm). When workers make a contact, there is a 0.5 probability that
only one rm was contacted and a 0.5 probability that two rms where con-
tacted. Hence, the distribution of wages faced by single [married] workers
in their search e¤ort is given by F (w) [H(w)] where
F (w) = 0:5G(w) + 0:5G(w)2 ) F (w) = (w   w¯ )(p  w¯ )
2(p  w)2
H(w) = 0:5I(w) + 0:5I(w)2 ) H(w) = (w   w¯ m)(p  w¯ m)
2(p  w)2
All workers, regardless of their marital status, receive unemployment benet
b while unemployed. When workers are married, they enjoy ow value m;
regardless of their labour market status (in addition to their wage if they are
employed, and to the unemployment benet if they are unemployed). Work-
ers contact rms at rate 0 when single and there is no on- the-job search.
They contact MPs at rate m and die at rate  when single, whatever their
employment status.
Marriage Partners (MPs).
MP s take as given the distribution of wages earned (by single workers, who
got their job while single), G(w)12 (including the reservation wage R); they
decide on their own reservation wage, T ,i.e., they will not marry anybody
earning less than T . When they are married to an employed worker earning
w, they enjoy ow value w. When they are married to an unemployed
11This means marriage partners will not marry a worker earning w < T:
12Since there is no on the job search, the distribution of wages o¤ered is the same as
the distribution of wages earned.
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worker receiving unemployment benet b, they enjoy ow value b13. MPs
contact workers at rate  and die at rate  when single.
When married, I assume that marriage partners and workers die simultane-
ously, also at rate : Notice that the marriage market is a matching market
with non-transferable utility. The labour market is a pure search market,
since rms can absorb all workers that contact her and accept her wage o¤er.
Below I characterise the possible equilibria in this model. I term them the
Very Picky Equilibrium (V P )14, the Smitten (S) Equilibrium15, and the
Picky Equilibrium (P )16. In the sections below, when the subscripts vp; s
or p appear on a variable, this denotes that the variable takes the value
corresponding to the V P; S or P equilibrium respectively.
2 The Very Picky Equilibrium (VP).
In the V P equilibrium, unemployed workers are willing to accept wages that
make them unmarriageable (which means thatMP s reject marriage to some
employed workers and with unemployed workers17).
Workers.
Assume single workers decide on a reservation wage R = Rw. Then, follow-
ing the desired properties of the V P equilibrium, I require that
i)Rw < T < w; ii)Rw > b
13MP s do not participate in the labour market. It is not an unrealistic assumption to
think of agents that do not engage in the labour market. Even today, this is the case for
women in some developing countries.
14Becaue MP s only marry employed workers earning a wage strictly higher than the
workers reservation wage.
15Becaue MP s marry all workers disregarding their labour market status.
16Becaue MP s reject marriage to unemployed workers but accept all employed workers.
17This is not necesarilly true always. There may be reasons why a MP could prefer
marriage to an unemployed worker over marriage to a low earner, but these are not built
into this model. Uncertainty over the unemployed workers productiviy is an example, as
this would imply uncertainty over the workers expected performance in the labour market.
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Condition i) ensures that unemployed workers are willing to accept wages
that make them unmarriageable. Condition ii) ensures that the minimum
wage accepted by unemployed workers is strictly higher than their unem-
ployment benet b18. If working at a wage x < T , the workers payo¤ is
given by V1(x) dened by rV1(x) = x   V1(x), since there is no expecta-
tion of marrying: If working at a wage x  T; the workers payo¤ is given
by V2(x) where rV2(x) = x + m(V3(x)   V2(x))   V2(x) (since m is the
rate at which marriageable workers meetMP s), where V3(x) is the payo¤ of
being married and working at wage x. If working at a wage x and married,
the workers payo¤ is given by V3(X), where rV3(x) = w+m  V3(x): The
payo¤ of being single is given by
rV0 = b+0
TZ
w
¯
[max(V1(x); V0)  V0)] f(x)dx+0
wZ
T
[max(V2(x); V0)  V0] f(x)dx V0
(1)
In equation (1), a worker faces a wage o¤er distribution F (w). He receives b
while unemployed. He contacts rms at rate 0: If the contacted rm o¤ers
a wage x such that Rw < x  T; then he must choose between accepting
the job which makes him unmarriageable with payo¤ V1(x) or remaining
single. If the rm o¤ers a wage x such that T  x < w then the worker
must choose between accepting the job which makes him marriageable with
payo¤ V2(x) or remaining single. The worker dies at rate : Given a wage
o¤er w has been received by a worker, @V1(w)@w > 0 and
@V0
@w = 0: Then, the
standard denition of a reservation wage implies V1(Rw) = V0, w ? Rw
) V1(w) ? V0: Hence, the worker accepts any wage w  Rw; and (1) can
18Rw < b is not rational from the unemployed workers point of view, and R = b would
lead to a qualitatively di¤erent type of equilibrium as will become clear later
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be written19:
rV0 = b+ 0
TZ
Rw
[V1(x)  V0)] f(x)dx+ 0
wZ
T
[V2(x)  V0] f(x)dx  V0 (2)
Integration by parts of (2) using V1(x); V2(x); V3(x) and V1(Rw) = V0 yields
Rw = b+
0mm(1  F (T ))
(r + @ + m)(r + )
+ 0
wZ
Rw
1  F (x)
r + 
dx
In the above equation, the rst and third elements of the right hand side are
standard: the reservation wage must compensate the worker for the loss
of unemployment benet and for the option of continued search for better
wages. The second term relates to the marriage option. If the workers ac-
cept wages that make them unmarriageable, they are giving up the expected
utility attached to marriageability20. The reservation wages must compen-
sate them for this loss. In the limit as r ! 0; and using F (w) as in Section
1 with Rw =w¯
and w¯= p+w¯2 , this yields
Rw = b+
k0kmm
h
1  (Rw T )( p+Rw)
2(p T )2
i
1 + km
  k0ln(2)( p+Rw)
2
(3)
where ki = i :
From (3), it is possible to derive the necessary results to characterise the
behaviour of Rw in the range Rw < T < w. The closed form solution for Rw
from (3) is rather cumbersome, and is therefore relegated to the Appendix.
To avoid technical complications, I will assume m < ma, where ma =
(1+km)(p b)
(k0ln(2)+3)kmk0
: The intuition behind this condition is easier to explain after
19Considering as well that V2(w) > V1(w)
20Notice this is just the ow value of marriage (m) discounted by the relevant factors.
Upon continued search, ow utility m would be enjoyed if a rm is contacted (which
happens at rate 0) that o¤ers a marriageable wage (which happens with probability
1   F (T ) given a rm has been contacted); and then a marriage partner is contacted
(which happens at rate m) .
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stating and explaining Proposition 1 below. In Proposition 1, I evaluate Rw
in the two extremes: when T = Rw (as low as it can be) and when T = w
(as high as it can be); and I characterise the behaviour of Rw(T ) in the
region Rw(T ) < T < w.
Proposition 1.
i) T = Rw(T ) implies Rw(T ) = R1 and T = T1 where
R1 = T1 =
(1 + km)(2b+ k0ln(2)p) + 2k0kmm
(1 + km)(2 + k0ln(2))
ii) T = w implies Rw(T ) = R2 and T = T2 where
R2 =
2b+ k0ln(2)p
2 + k0ln(2)
< R1; T2 =
p(1 + k0ln(2)) + b
2 + k0ln(2)
> T1
iii) T2 > T1 and (3) represents a downward sloping and concave curve in
Rw; T space in the range Rw < T < w.
Proof. See appendix.
Figure 1 exemplies the situation. The intuition for Figure 1 is as follows:
i) If m is very high, marriage is too valuable for workers. They would never
be willing to accept an unmarriageable wage, as that would mean giving up
the prospect of enjoying m altogether.
ii) Assume m is high but not so high (m < ma satises "m is not so high").
Hence, workers could be willing to accept a non-marriageable wage under
certain conditions. Assume as well that Rw(T ) = T . As T goes up, workers
have less incentive to reject any wage x < T , since further search is less likely
to produce a marriageable wage. This implies Rw(T ) goes down.
iii) If m is very high, the e¤ect of an increasing T on Rw(T ) is very high.
Hence, as T goes up, Rw(T ) falls very fast. If m  ma as dened above;
then Rw(T ) falls below b before T = w. From then on, even as T continues
increasing, equation (3) no longer describes the behaviour of Rw, as it would
be irrational for workers to accept a lower reservation wage. I am avoiding
this last complication by assuming m < ma:
Marriage Partners.
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AssumeMP s know workers use reservation wage R = Rmp. The properties
of the V P equilibrium require
i)Rmp < T < w; ii)Rmp > b
MP s enjoy X while single21, and they contact employed marriageable work-
ers at rate vp: If they only accept marriage with employed workers earning
w  T > Rmp then their payo¤ is given by
rM1 = X + vp
wZ
T
[M2(x) M1] g(x)dx  M1 (4)
In (4), given a contact with a single-employed worker earning T < w < w,
marriage occurs yielding payo¤M2(x) (the payo¤ of an MP married to an
employed worker earning wage x: The workers wage is a random draw from
G(w)22. The MP dies at rate . The value M2(x) is given by
rM2(x) = x  M2(x) (5)
In (5) above, if the MP is married to an employed worker, then its status will
only change if death arrives, which happens at rate : Given a contact with a
worker earning w, notice that M2(w)w > 0 and
M1
w = 0: ThenM2(T ) =M1,
M2(T ) ?M1 if w 7 T . Integration by parts of (4) using (5) and evaluating
in the limit as r ! 0 implies
T = X + vp
wZ
T
[1 G(x)] dx
where vp =
vp
 : Using G(x) as above and integrating, the above can be
written as
T = X + vp

ln

p Rmp
2(p  T )

  1

(p Rmp) + 2(p  T )) (6)
21There are many possible interpretations for X: Living at home, working in a low
wage competitive labour market, the possibility of marrying di¤erently skilled workers,
etc. A more detailed characterisation of X is discussed in the conclusion.
22The distribution of wages earned by single-employed workers.
12
I now characterise the behaviour of (6) when b < Rmp(T ) < T < w. Propo-
sition 2 below lists all required information to sketch the graph of (6) in
Rmp(T ); T space . Such a graph is depicted in Figure 2. To state Proposi-
tion 2, I follow the same strategy used for Proposition 1: I evaluate Rmp(T )
in the extremes where T = Rmp(T ) and when T = w; and I characterise
Rmp(T ) when T satises Rmp(T ) < T < w
Proposition 2. If p > X, then
i) T = Rmp(T ) implies T = T3, Rmp(T ) = R3; where
R3 = T3 =
vpp(1  ln(2)) +X
1 + vp(1  ln(2))
< w
ii) T = w implies T = T4 and Rmp(T ) = R4; where
R4 =  p+ 2X < w; T4 = X
iii) R3 > R4; T3 > T4 and (6) represents an upward sloping and convex line
in Rmp(T ); T space for Rmp(T ) < T < w.
Proof. See appendix.
Following the results in Proposition 2, one can sketch the graph of (6) as
in Figure 2.
An equilibrium exists if the functionsRw(T ) andRmp(T ) cross whileRw(T ) <
T < w and Rmp(T ) < T < w: In order to state Lemma 1 below, I rst dene
Xa =
p(1 + k0 ln(2)) + b
2 + k0 ln(2)
< p
Lemma 1. X = Xa implies R4 = R2 and T4 = T2: This implies a situation
as depicted in Figure 3.
Proof. See appendix.
Lemma 2. As X decreases, Rw(T ) remains unchanged and Rmp(T ) shifts
to the left. If X = Xa   ;  > 0 then the V P Equilibrium obtains. The
situation is as depicted in Figure 4.
Proof. See appendix.
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Lemma 3. T1  T3 if and only if X  Xb, where
Xb =
2b

1 + vp(1  ln(2))

2 + k0ln(2)
+
2k0kmm

1 + vp(1  ln(2))

(2 + k0ln(2)) (1 + km)
+
(2vp(ln(2)  1) + k0ln(2))p
2 + k0ln(2)
and m < ma ) Xb < Xa: In this case, the situation is as depicted in Figure
5, and the V P equilibrium does not obtain if this is the case.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 3. The V P Equilibrium obtains if Xb  X < Xa:
Proof. See appendixFollowing Lemmas 1-3 and by inspection of the asso-
ciated Figures, if the condition in Proposition 3 hold, the situation is as
depicted in Figure 4.
3 The Smitten Equilibrium (S).
As opposed to the V P equilibrium, in the S equilibrium marriage partners
are willing to marry any worker, regardless of its employment status or wage
earned.
Workers.
The payo¤ of an unemployed and single worker is described by
rV0 = b+ 0
wZ
w
¯
[max(V2(x); V0)  V0] f(x)dx+ m(V 00   V0)  V0 (7)
where V 00 is the payo¤ of being married and unemployed. In (7) above, the
worker enjoys unemployment benet b. Upon a contact with a rm (at rate
0), the worker accepts the job and is marriageable since all workers are
marriageable. The distribution of wages faced by single workers is F (w).
At rate m; an MP is contacted and marriage occurs. The worker dies at
rate : The payo¤ of being married and unemployed is given by
rV 00 = b+m+ 0
wmZ
w
¯ m
[max(V3(x); V0)  V0]h(x)dx  V0 (8)
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In 8) above, the worker enjoys unemployment benet b and the utility de-
rived from marriage. Upon contact with a rm, a job is accepted and the
worker becomes married and employed. The distribution of wages faced by
married workers is H(w). Notice, the minimum wage for married workers
is given by w
¯ m
, not w
¯
: Arguments analogous to those applied to (1) imply
(7) and (8) can be written as23
rV0 = b+ 0
wZ
R
[V2(x)  V0] f(x)dx+ m(V 00   V0)  V0 (9)
rV 00 = b+m+ 0
wmZ
Rm
[V3(x)  V0]h(x)dx  V0 (10)
24Integration by parts of (9) and (10), using V2(x) and V3(x), F (w) with
R =w
¯
, w¯= p+w¯2 and H(w) with Rm =w¯ m
; wm =
p+w
¯ m2 yields
R = Rm =
2b+ k0ln(2)p
2 + k0ln(2)
(11)
Notice these two reservation wages are independent of m. This is because
workers need not worry about marriageability when determining their reser-
vation wage, since they are always marriageable. This is also the intuition
for the equality R = Rm:
Marriage Partners.
The payo¤ of a single MP s must be because now single MP s marry any
worker met, regardless of employment status. Hence
rM1 = X + s
wZ
R
[M2(x) M1] g(x)dx+ us (M0  M1)  M1
23Given a wage o¤er w has been received by a single worker, @V1(w)
@w
> 0 and @V0
@w
= 0:
Then, the standard denition of a reservation wage implies V1(R) = V0, w ? R) V1(w) ?
V0: Given a wage o¤er w has been received by a married worker,
@V3(w)
@w
> 0 and @V
0
0
@w
= 0:
Then, the standard denition of a reservation wage implies V1(Rm) = V 00 , w ? Rm
) V3(w) ? V0:
24Recall the assumption that divorce is innitely costly. Hence, whatever wage the
married worker accepts, he will remain married.
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At rate s an employed marriageable worker is contacted, and the distribu-
tion of wages earned is G(w)25. Marriage occurs and new MPs status is
"married to employed worker earning w", with payo¤ M2(w) (as given by
(5)above). At rate us ; an unemployed worker is contacted. Marriage oc-
curs yielding new status as "married to an unemployed worker", with payo¤
M0 given by:
rM0 = b+ 0
wmZ
Rm
[M2(x) M(u)]h(x)dx  M0
In this equation, the MP 0s unemployed partner contacts a rm at rate 0;
which o¤ers a wage w such that Rm  w  w and distributed according to
H(w)26.
Integration by parts of M0 and M1 above, using G(x);H(x);as dened be-
fore, M2(w) as in (5), and R =w¯
, w = p+R2 and Rm =w¯ m
, wm =
p+Rm
2
yields
(r +  + 0)M0 = b  0(Rm(ln(2)  2)  ln(2)p)
2(r + @)
(12)
(r + s + 
u
s + @)M1 = X + 
u
sM0 +
ps(1  ln(2)) + sln(2)R
r + 
(13)
Proposition 4.
The S Equilibrium obtains if M0 > M1 () X < Xc where
Xc =
2b [1 + s(1  ln(2))]
2 + k0ln(2)
+
p [2s(ln(2)  1) + k0ln(2))]
2 + k0ln(2)
Proof. See Appendix. For further reference, notice that Xc = Xb(m =
0; s = vp):
4 The Picky Equilibrium (P).
In the P equilibrium, MP s marry workers if and only if these are in em-
ployment. I construct this equilibrium by proposing that all workers and
25The distribution of wages earned by single-employed workers.
26Because he is married. Hence, he faces wage distribution H(w) (not G(w)) with
minimum wage Rm (not R).
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MP s use the same reservation wage, so T = R = Tp =
pp(1 ln(2))+X
1+p(1 ln(2)) : If
this is true in equilibrium, then it implies w
¯
= Tp. The proof of Proposition
5 below shows when no individual worker or MP has an incentive to devi-
ate from this strategy. The problem for an MP who is single is therefore
to choose a reservation wage T , assuming that the minimum wage in the
distribution of earned wages27 is given by Tp:
rM1;w
¯
=Tp = X + p
wZ
T

M2(x) M1;w
¯
=Tp

g(x)dx  M1 (14)
where G(w) is as given in Section 1 but using w
¯
= Tp: It is easy to show
through integration by parts of (14) that T (w
¯
= Tp) = Tp
28:
An unemployed workers problem in this environment can be presented in a
way more convenient for my purposes in this section29, as it is more familiar
to the concept of a corner solution. The payo¤ of an unemployed worker is
described by V0 as in (2) but with w¯
= Tp: If the worker decides to accept
any o¤er with wage x  R; then, the workers problem is Max
R
V0 subject
to:
i)F (w) as given in Section 1
ii)V1(x); V2(x) and V3(x) as given in Section 2
iii) R  Tp; w = p+ Tp
2
This problem is analogue to the one solved in Section 1, and therefore yields
R = Rw as in equation (3)
R(X) = b+
k0kmm
h
1  (w¯  T )( p+w¯ )
2(p T )2
i
1 + km
  k0ln(2)( p+ w¯ )
2
27Earned by workers who got their job while single.
28 In fact it was done in Section 2 with the di¤erence that Section 2 uses vpinstead of
p
29This is equivalent to the one used so far.
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Because in the P equilibrium w
¯
= T = Tp, I impose this to get
R(X;w
¯
= T = Tp) = b+
k0kmM
1 + km
+
k0ln(2)(p X)
2(1 + p(1  ln(2)))
= Re(X)
Before stating Proposition 5 below, it helps to recall that Rm =
2b+k0ln(2)p
2+k0ln(2)
.
Proposition 5. Assume Xb0 < X < Xb, where
Xb0 =
2b(1 + p(1  ln(2)))
2 + k0ln(2)
+
p(2p(ln(2)  1) + k0ln(2))
2 + k0ln(2)
and Xb has been dened above. Then an equilibrium exists where R =
T = Tp:
Proof. See appendix.
5 Matching and Steady State.
To keep things simple, I use quadratic matching in the marriage market and
cloning of single MP s. I normalise the number of single MPs to m; and
assume that a new marriage partner comes into the market every time one
gets married or dies, so as to maintain that stock constant.
Workers can be in either of ves states: us is the total number of work-
ers who are single and unemployed , es are single and employed earning a
marriageable wage w  T , um are married and unemployed; em are married
and employed and enm are employed and not marriageable. I assume that a
worker comes into the market as single and unemployed every time a worker
dies, whatever its state, and normalise so that us;i+es;i+um;i+em;i+enm;i =
1; where i = vp; p; s
Smitten Equilibrium.
Unemployed single workers. The ow in is given by those who replace dead
workers (). The ow out is given by those workers in this stock who die,
marry or nd a job. Hence, steady state requires  = us;s( + m + w))
us;s =

+m+w
:
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Employed single workers. The ow in is given by those workers who are
unemployed and single and nd a job. The ow out is given by those in this
stock who die and those who marry after contacting a MP. Hence, the stock
es;s is constant if us;sw = es;s(m+); which implies es;s = +m+w
w
m+
:
Unemployed married workers. The ow in is given by those workers who
are single and unemployed and marry after contacting a MP . The ow out
is given by those in this stock who die or nd a job. Hence, steady state
requires us;s = um;s( + w)) um;s = us;s m+w = +m+w m+w
Employed married workers. The ow in is given by those workers who
are employed and single and marry after contacting a MP ; and by those
married and unemployed who nd a job. The ow out is given by those in
this stock who die. Hence, steady state requires es;sm+um;sw = em;s )
em;s = es;s
m
 +
um;sw
 ) em;s = +m+w wm+ m + +m+w m+w w
Employed non marriageable workers. All workers are marriageable in the
S equilibrium, so enm;s = 0
Given that I use a quadratic meeting function, this means that us =

+m+w
m
+w
=
us;s and s =

+m+w
w
m+
= es;s.
Very Picky Equilibrium.
The di¤erence compared to the S equilibrium is that unemployed workers
cannot get married, and not all employed workers can get married, but only
those that earn R  T .
Unemployed single workers. The ow in is given by those who replace dead
workers. The ow out is given by those workers in this stock who die or
nd a job. Hence, steady state requires  = us;vp( + w)) us;vp = +w :
Employed single workers. The ow in is given by those workers who are
unemployed and single and nd a job with a marriageable wage. The ow
out is given by those workers in this stock who die or marry after contacting
a MP . Hence, steady state requires us;vpw(1   F (T )) = es;vp(m + )
which substituting out us;vp implies es;vp = +w
w(1 F (T ))
m+
:
Unemployed married workers. Unemployed workers are not marriageable
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in this equilibrium so um;vp = 0
Employed married workers. The ow in is given by those workers who are
single and employed marry after contacting a MP . The ow out is given
by those in this stock who die. Hence, steady state requires es;vpm =
em;vp ) em;vp = es;vp m ) em;vp = +w
w(1 F (T ))
m+
m
 :
Employed non marriageable workers. The ow in is given by those workers
who are unemployed and single and accept an job with a unmarriageable
wage. The ow out is given by those workers in this stock who die. Hence,
steady state requires us;vpwF (T ) = enm;vp; which implies enm;vp =
wF (T )
+w
:
Again, given the quadratic meeting technology in the marriage market, this
means that vp =

+w
w(1 F (T ))
m+
= es;vp:
Lemma 4. X = Xb implies Xb = Xb(vp = vp) where vp =

+w
w
m+
>
s
Proof. See appendix.
Picky Equilibrium.
Because in the P equilibrium R = T and unemployed workers are not mar-
riageable, all stocks are as in the V P equilibrium but with F (T ) = 0.
The proposition below summarises the information of Propositions 3,4 and
5. I use it to introduce the next section that deals with a mixed strategy
equilibrium.
Summary Proposition. For 0 < m < ma :
If Xb(vp = 

vp) < X < Xa, an equilibrium obtains where R < T , and
R1 < R  R2; T3 < T  T4
If Xb0 < X  Xb(vp = vp), an equilibrium obtains where R = T = T3.
If X < Xc, an equilibrium exists where R = T =
2b+k0ln(2)p
2+k0ln(2)
:
6 A mixed strategy equilibrium.
Lemma 5. Assume 0 < m < ma: Then Xc < Xb0 :30.
30The intuition for this gap is as follows: Assume MP s marry all employed workers,
regardless of their wage, and single unemployed workers decide on a reservation wage R
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Proof. See appendix
Following Lemma 5, this section shows that a mixed strategy equilibrium
obtains if Xc  X  Xb0 : In the mixed strategy equilibrium, MP s marry
all employed workers and marry unemployed workers with probability :
Hence, the value of a MP that is single is given by
rM1 = X + m
wZ
R
[M2(x) M1] g(x)dx+ um(M0  M1)  M1 (15)
whereM0 is value of marriage to an unemployed worker. Subscript m iden-
ties the mixed strategy equilibrium. and um is the number of unemployed
workers. M0 is described by the following equation
rM0 = b+ 0
wmZ
Rm
[M2(x) M0]h(x)dx  M0 (16)
where Rm =
2b+k0ln(2)p
2+k0ln(2)
. Recall the distribution of wages o¤ered to married
employers is given by I(x); which implies that the distribution of wages
faced by married workers in their job search is H(x). The mixing strategy
is rational only ifM1 =M0: Integration by parts and algebraic manipulation
of (15) and (16) above shows that this occurs only if X = Xc0, where
Xc0 =
2b(m(1  ln(2)) + 1)
2 + k0ln(2)
+
p(2m(ln(2)  1) + k0ln(2))
2 + k0ln(2)
The steady state equations in the mixed strategy equilibrium are as follows:
The stock us;m remains constant if  = us;m( + m + w) ) us;m =

+m+w
: The steady state equation for es;m is given given by es;m =
based on this. Now assume that MP s start marrying only workers earning a wage T > R.
If unemployed workers will still accept jobs at wages w < T , they must be compensated
for the loss of marriageability. This implies that their reservation wage increases from R.
Notice that the shape of the wage distribution is not a¤ected. Hence, a higher R implies a
smaller relative wage inequality. Rather than reinforcing theMP sbehaviour of marrying
only high earners, this would give them further incentive to marry all employed workers,
as with a smaller relative wage inequality the option of continued search is less attractive.
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us;mw
m+
; which substituting out us;m implies es;m = w(+m+w)(m+) Stock
um;m remains constant if us;mm = um;m( + w); which means um;m =

+m+w
m
(+w)
: Stock em;m remains constant es;mm+um;mw = em;m )
em;m = es;m
m
 +
um;mw
 ) em;m = wm(+m+w)(m+) +
mw
(+m+w)(+w)
.
In this equilibrium, enm;m = 0. This means that m =
w
(+m+w)(m+)
=
es;m:
Proposition 7. A mixed strategy equilibrium obtains if Xc  X  Xb0
Proof. See appendix.
7 Conclusion.
I obtain the equilibria in a model in which a search labour market and a
matching marriage market interact. The economy is populated by ex-ante
homogeneous workers, ex-ante homogenous rms, and ex-ante homogeneous
marriage partners. Workers simultaneously search for rms in order to work
and for marriage partners in order to marry. Firms post wages to attract
workers; and marriage partners look for workers in order to marry. When
married, I assume that workers receive a pre-determined ow utility, and
that marriage partners derive utility equal to the workers wage. I show
that the so called "married wage premium" or, more generally, a correlation
between mens wages and marital status, can emerge as an equilibrium result
of having search frictions both in the labour and the marriage market31. I
do not know of another model that analyses the equilibrium interaction of
a search market (the labour market) and a matching market (the marriage
market), which I see as the main theoretical contribution of the paper.
In order to obtain clean analytical results, I use some assumptions the re-
moval of which seems interesting and is the basis of current research. For
example, if divorce is allowed, the model seems to yields empirically valid
predictions not only about the married wage premium, but also about the
31Not having to resort to the traditional explanations given for the existence of the
married wage premium.
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"divorced wage premium". Namely, that divorce men enjoy a wage premium
smaller than married men, but still positive over never married men. When
an unmarried and unemployed worker accepts an unmarriageable wage he
looses the option to get married in the future (or what I have termed "mar-
riageability"). When a married and unemployed worker accepts an unmar-
riageable wage he is divorced by his partner, thereby loosing marriage itself,
which is more valuable than the option of a future marriage. Hence, pro-
vided both have a reservation wage lower than that of marriage partners32,
the reservation wage of married workers is higher than the reservation wage
of unmarried workers, as they loose more when accepting an unmarriageable
wage.
I assume that single marriage partners enjoy a predetermined ow utility,
which I call X: Amongst other things, X could be interpreted as the option
of marrying di¤erently skilled workers. Preliminary research using this inter-
pretation yields interesting insights on which type of workers should enjoy
higher married wage premia. In particular, in a situation where there are
di¤erently skilled workers and high shilled workers are more likely to earn
high wages, a marriage partner could accept marriage to unemployed high
skill workers (expecting a high wage when the worker nds a job); but not
to low skill workers employed at a wage in the low end of the distribution.
Hence, a correlation exists between wages and marital status for low skill
workers, but not for high skill workers.
8 Appendix.
Proof of Proposition 1. Taken together, statements a)  d) below imply
Rw(T ) is downward sloping when Rw = T = R1; it decreases smoothly as T
increases and it is always higher than b for Rw < T < T2
32which can be shown to happen in some equilibria.
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a) From (3), it follows that Rw = b if T = Ta, where
Ta =
 4kmMp+ (kmm+ 2ln(2)p(1 + km))( p+ b) +
p
 
2( 2kmm+ ln(2)(1 + km)( p+ b))
  = ( Mkm( p+ b)2( 9kmm+ 4ln(2)(1 + km)( p+ b))
Further, Ta  T2 i¤m < ma as in the body of the paper.
b) Implicitly di¤erentiating (3) implies RwT whenRw = T = R1 is
Rw
T (Rw=T=R1)
=
k0kmM
3k0kmM+2(1+km)( p+b) : Further
Rw
T (Rw=T=R1)
< 0 when m < ma:
c) RwT = 0 if T = 2Rw p > w; and therefore not possible when Rw < T < w
d) m < ma implies   > 0 for Rw < T < w: So Rw(T ) is a "smooth" function
in that range.
Proof of Proposition 2. Items i) and ii) in Proposition 2 follow directly
from (6). Item iii) is the consequence of a)  c) below:
a) From (6), @T@Rmp > 1 when Rmp = T = R3. This is easy to show because
@T
@Rmp
=
(1 + vp)( p+ T )  vp(Rmp   T ))
vpln
(p Rmp)
2(p T ) (p  T )
which evaluated at Rmp = T = R3 is
(1+vp)
vp ln(2)
> 1.
b) @T@Rmp > 0 when Rmp < T < w: This is easy to show because a) above;
because @T@Rmp = 0 only if T =
p(1+vp)+vpRmp
1+2k
>
(p+Rmp)
2 = w; and
@T
@Rmp
exists when Rmp < T < w =
p+Rmp
2 :
c) [@T ]
2
@2Rmp
=
A1+vp(p+Rmp)+p T 2vpT )
vp
h
ln(
(p Rmp)
2(p T ) )(p T )
i2 whereA1 = ln( (p Rmp)2(p T ) )vp(p Rmp):Hence
[@T ]2
@2Rmp
> 0 i¤
A1 > A2 =  vp(p+Rmp)  p+ T + 2vpT:
Since (6) can be rewritten as A1 = Rmp  X   vp(p   2T + R) it is easy
to show that as long as p > X and (6) holds, then A1 > A2 which implies
[@T ]2
@2Rmp
> 0
Proof of Lemma 1. Follows immediately from solving the equations R4 =
R2 and T4 = T2:
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Proof of Lemma 2. From inspection (6) it follows that @Rw@X = 0: From
implicit di¤erentiation of (6) it follows that
(a)
@Rmp
@X =
1
vpln(
h
(p R)
2(p Rmp)
i ; and @Rmp@X < 0 if Rmp < T < w: (b) @T@X =
(p Rm)
(1+vp)(p Rm)+vp(R Rm) ; and
@T
@X > 0 if Rmp < T < w: (c)
@T4
@X = 1 > 0:
Statements (a)   (c) above imply that as X declines, the graph of Rmp(T )
in the Rmp; T space shifts to the left. Starting at X = Xa, a small enough
decline in X yields a situation as depicted in Figure 4.
Proof of Lemma 3. Follows directly by using T1 and T3.
Proof of Proposition 3. Follows immediately from Lemmas 1-3.
Proof of Proposition 4. Follows immediately from equations (12) and
(13). For further reference, notice that Xc = Xb(m = 0; s = vp):
Proof of Proposition 5. It is straightforward to show that the opti-
mal reservation wage chosen by an MP is T (w
¯
= Tp) = Tp. I must also
show that MP s do not have an incentive to marry unemployed workers.
Because the relevant distribution of wages faced married unemployed work-
ers is H(x) the value of marriage to an unemployed worker is given by
rM0 = b+0
wmR
Rm
[M2(x) M0]h(x)dx  M0, where Rm = 2b+k0ln(2)p2+k0ln(2) : Sim-
ple manipulation of M1;w
¯
=Tp and of M0 shows that M1;w¯ =Tp
 M0 if and
only if X  Xb0 as in Proposition 5. Now consider the problem of an
unemployed worker as described in this subsection. I rst obtain R and
evaluate it when w
¯
= T = Tp to obtain R(X;w¯
= T = Tp) = R
e(X): It is
easy to show that Re(X) is downward sloping and continuous in the range
Xb0  X < p. Also, one can show that Re(Xb) = Tp: Hence, for X  Xb
we have R = Re(X)  Tp, and the equilibrium breaks. For X < Xb; then
Re(X) > Tp; so workers reach a corner solution where R = Tp:
Proof of Lemma 4. X = Xb implies T1 = T3 = R3 = R1: Hence, in
equilibrium, T = R and F (T ) = 0; and this implies vp = 

vp.
Proof of Lemma 5. Take Xb(vp = vp) and Xc as given in Lemma 4
and Proposition 4 respectively. Assume for a moment that s = 

vp: Then
Xc = Xb(m = 0) < Xb(m > 0): Further @Xc@s > 0 and s < 

vp. This
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necessarily implies that Xc < Xb(vp = 

vp) for m  0:
Proof of Proposition 7. It is easy to show that i)  = 0 implies m = p
which implies Xc0 = Xb0 ; ii)  = 1 implies m = s which implies Xc0 = Xc;
and that iii) Xc0@ < 0:
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Figure 1: Rw when Rw < T < w
Figure 2: Rmp when Rmp < T < w.
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Figure 3: Rw and Rmp when X = Xa
Figure 4: Rw and Rmp when X = Xa   
Figure 5: Rw and Rmp when X < Xb < Xa
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